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Abstract
We review and integrate a wide range of literature that has examined the strat-
egies by which organizations navigate institutionally diverse settings and
capture rents outside of the marketplace. We synthesize this body of research
under the umbrella term institutional strategies, which we deﬁne as the com-
prehensive set of plans and actions directed at leveraging and shaping socio-
political and cultural institutions to obtain or retain competitive advantage.
Our review of institutional strategies is focused on emerging market contexts,
settings that are characterized by weak capital market and regulatory infra-
structures and fast-paced turbulent change. Under such challenging con-
ditions, strategies aimed at shaping the institutional environment may be
especially critical to an organization’s performance and long-term survival.
Our review reveals that organizations engage in three speciﬁc and identiﬁable
sets of institutional strategies, which we term relational, infrastructure-build-
ing, and socio-cultural bridging. We conclude by highlighting fruitful avenues
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for cross-disciplinary dialogue in the hope of promoting future research on
emerging markets and deﬁning the next frontier of institutional theory in
organizational analysis.
Institutional Strategies in Emerging Markets
In an increasingly complex and integrated global economy, a signiﬁcant chal-
lenge for organizations is navigating institutionally diverse contexts—each
posing a different set of opportunities and challenges. Scholars over the past
decades have articulated the multifaceted inﬂuence of institutions on organiz-
ations and competition, with some traditions foregrounding formal and legal
aspects (Hall, 1986; North, 1990; Williamson, 2000), while others focusing
more on informal and socio-cultural aspects (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983;
Meyer & Rowan, 1977). North (1991, p. 87) deﬁned institutions as
“humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social
interaction”. For Scott (2014, p. 56), institutions are the “regulative, normative,
and cultural-cognitive elements that, together with associated activities and
resources, provide stability and meaning to social life”. While extensive
research has focused on the effects of institutional variation on organizations
(Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011; Peng, Wang,
& Jiang, 2008), less attention has been paid to examining the ways in which
organizations purposefully and strategically shape their institutional environ-
ment to enhance their competitive advantage. Yet, as recent research has
shown, the effective management of socio-political and cultural institutions
is no less important to organizational survival than marketplace success
(Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Marquis & Qian, 2014;
Seelos & Mair, 2007).
In this paper, we review and integrate recent literatures that have documen-
ted a variety of strategies by which organizations attend to institutionally
diverse settings and capture rents outside of the marketplace, including collec-
tive mobilization strategies that seek to inﬂuence the public policy arena
(Henisz & Zelner, 2003; Hillman, Keim, & Schuler, 2004), to transform insti-
tutions (Campbell, 1998; Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Lawrence, 1999), and to engage
with key stakeholder groups (Freeman, 1984; Galaskiewicz, 1985; Mitchell,
Agle, & Wood, 1997). While these efforts have shed light on the complexity
of organizational behaviors, our understanding of the diversity and contextual
relevance of different types of institutional strategies remains balkanized and
selective.
We focus our review of institutional strategies on emerging market econom-
ies—countries characterized by rapid industrialization, economic liberalization
and increased integration into the global economy. In these contexts, the
society and economy are rapidly co-evolving, such that the onus is often on
organizations to pursue and promote not only economic, but also social
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development (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & Wright, 2000; Luo, 2006; Mair, Marti,
& Ventresca, 2012). In the last decade, emerging markets have assumed a pro-
minent position in the global economy and they are projected to account for
more than half of world GDP on the basis of purchasing power by the end
of 2014 (see Figure 1). The rapid rise and development of countries such as
China, India, Brazil, and South Africa in the twenty-ﬁrst century has attracted
tremendous interest from managers and investors, yet our theories have not
kept pace (Davis & Marquis, 2005). As Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson, and
Peng (2005, p. 27) convincingly argue, research with a focus on emerging econ-
omies is both an opportunity and a necessity—as they are “fertile grounds not
only for testing existing theories but also for developing new ones”. Accord-
ingly, we propose that research in emerging economies feature more promi-
nently in organizational studies as we move forward.
While the speciﬁc context that we examine is emerging economies, our
intention is to review and synthesize various streams of research in order to
identify and map the complex array of institutional strategies that ﬁrms under-
take—which can then be generalized to business organizations in other con-
texts as well. To date, strategies that can be considered part of ﬁrms’
institutional strategizing have been variously referred to as non-market or pol-
itical strategies (Baron, 1995; De Figueiredo & Tiller, 2001; Hillman & Hitt,
1999; Hillman et al., 2004), collective action (King & Pearce, 2010; Schneiberg
& Lounsbury, 2008; Walker & Rea, 2014), resource dependence (Mizruchi,
1989; Oliver, 1991; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), and stakeholder management
(Freeman, 1984; Mitchell et al., 1997). Although these literatures are not tra-
ditionally considered under the institutional theory ambit, a common feature
is that they address how organizations strategically manage their broader
Figure 1 World GDP Trends for Advanced and Emerging Market Economies.
Note: GDP based on PPP share of world total.
Source: International Monetary Fund, April 2014 World Economic Outlook Database.
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external environments; and, as such, provide important insights for theorizing
about institutional processes. Conceptualizing strategies as “institutional” pro-
vides an opportunity to integrate these rich, yet disparate streams of research—
and, thus, offers a more accurate identiﬁcation of the overarching conceptual
domain. Furthermore, while studies have examined emerging market contexts
from a variety of different theoretical perspectives, we argue that an insti-
tutional lens is particularly useful in these contexts because they are under-
going large-scale economic and social changes that are still little understood
(Roland, 2000).
We deﬁne the term institutional strategy as “the comprehensive set of plans
and actions directed at leveraging and shaping socio-political and cultural
institutions to maintain or improve an organization’s competitive position”.
Our review of the literature reveals that organizations engage in three speciﬁc
and identiﬁable sets of institutional strategies, which we term relational, infra-
structure-building, and socio-cultural bridging. Relational strategies involve
networking efforts to cultivate and manage dependency relationships with
the government and key stakeholder groups (Marquis & Qian, 2014; Siegel,
2007). Infrastructure-building strategies address missing or inadequate regulat-
ory, technological, and physical infrastructures that support business activities
(Mair &Marti, 2009; Rao, 1998; Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 2008). Socio-cultural
bridging strategies tackle socio-cultural and demographic issues that can
hinder economic development and trade—for example, political and social
unrest, illiteracy, poverty, and ethnic or religious conﬂicts.
In unpacking the concept of institutional strategies in this way, we aim to
develop an integrative framework that outlines a more interactive and
reciprocal view of institutional processes—one that highlights the agentic
and intent-driven nature of organizations’ engagement with institutions, and
the importance of institutional perspectives in ﬁrms’ strategic action in a glo-
balizing economy. We argue that such a perspective is an important new fron-
tier of institutional research in organizational studies. Accordingly, we focus
our review on highlighting fruitful areas for cross-disciplinary dialogue, and
on providing a roadmap for future scholarship on navigating the complexities
of diverse institutional environments.
Institutional Strategies as the New Frontier of Institutional Research in
Organizational Studies
Beginning in the 1970s, scholars from various disciplines including economics,
political science, and sociology began focusing on how institutions—or the
formal and informal “rules of the game”—affected organizational and econ-
omic activity (North, 1990; Scott, 2001). In organization studies, the research
that built on this tradition tended to emphasize the capacity of institutions
to control and constrain organizational behavior by “deﬁning legal, moral,
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and cultural boundaries and distinguishing between acceptable and unaccepta-
ble behavior” (Scott, 2014, p. 58). Signiﬁcant empirical work in this area, for
example, focused on how social and cultural expectations exerted pressures
on an organization to conform to “legitimate practice” within a given insti-
tutional ﬁeld (e.g. Davis, 1991; Fligstein, 1985; Galaskiewicz & Wasserman,
1989). This early work in institutional theory was powerful in demonstrating
the substantial isomorphic forces in organizational ﬁelds—thus, addressing
DiMaggio and Powell’s original question of “why do organizations look so
similar?”
Later streams of research within organization studies shifted the focus from
examining continuity and constraint in social structures to exploring how
actors exercise agentic behavior and instigate change (cf. Hirsch & Lounsbury,
1997; Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012). Drawing upon resource depen-
dence arguments, Oliver (1991) argued that organizations do not passively
conform to homogenizing institutional pressures. Instead, some organizations
actively resist these pressures by challenging them, dismissing them, or co-
opting the sources of the pressures (Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007). And
research on institutional entrepreneurship and institutional work has docu-
mented how actors leverage material and symbolic resources to create new
institutions or to transform existing ones (Battilana, Leca, & Boxenbaum,
2009; Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2009; Maguire, Hardy, & Lawrence,
2004). Despite offering considerable insights into how actors engage in proac-
tive agentive behaviors to instigate broad transformational change, existing
models have typically assumed a ﬁeld-level perspective—with less attention
being paid to how organizations strategically shape their institutional contexts
to further their own individual ends.
Scholars in strategy and international business have also increasingly advo-
cated taking an “institution-based” approach. With the changing competitive
landscape confronting ﬁrms as globalization has progressed, there is increasing
recognition that research needs to investigate and understand how contextual
factors affect competition, performance, and the development of sustainable
competitive advantages (Ahuja & Yayavaram, 2011; Oliver, 1997; Peng, Sun,
Pinkham, & Chen, 2009; Peng et al., 2008). For instance, Ingram and Silverman
(2002, p. 20) contend that “institutions directly determine what arrows a ﬁrm
has in its quiver as it struggles to formulate and implement strategy”. While
this stream of research has tended to point to legitimacy and reputational
pressures for social conformity, there has been growing recognition that orga-
nizations act strategically when confronted with institutional constraints—
both those related to variation across global contexts generally and the particu-
larities of local contexts.
Building on the widespread interest in institutional processes, we review a
series of literatures that explore how organizations interact with, navigate,
and shape their external environments. While these literatures stem from
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different legacies and antecedents, taking stock of this growing body of
research is critical to our capacity to think comprehensively about the insti-
tutional conditions confronting organizations. We integrate this work under
a common heading by adopting a broad deﬁnition of institutional strat-
egies—one that includes all plans and actions taken by an organization to stra-
tegically manage socio-political and cultural institutions, and/or leverage them
to its competitive advantage. The term institutional strategy was ﬁrst con-
sidered by Lawrence (1999, p. 161), who identiﬁed two basic types: “(1) mem-
bership strategies that involve the deﬁnition of rules of membership and their
meaning for an institutional community; and (2) standardization strategies
that are concerned with the establishment of technical legal or market stan-
dards that deﬁne the ‘normal’ processes involved in the production of some
good or service”. While we agree that these are important, they may only
scratch the surface of what is possible and necessary in today’s global environ-
ment. Our main point is that organizations need to be proactive about diagnos-
ing and shaping their external environments. Contrasting with earlier
perspectives that viewed institutions as top-down pressures that constrain
social and organizational behavior, our perspective foregrounds the strategic
interaction between organizations and their institutional environments. In
doing so, our review aims to showcase institutional theory as a theory of
action for the twenty-ﬁrst century.
In the following section, we outline the critical features that differentiate
emerging markets from developed and developing markets, and draw atten-
tion to the importance of these differences in affecting an organization’s
operations, strategic focus, and overall competitive landscape. In the discus-
sion, we offer recommendations for future research that examines how the
institutional strategies that we identify may vary across different emerging
economies.
Why Institutional Strategies are Essential in Emerging Markets
As locations of future growth for ﬁrms, emerging markets have attracted
increasing scholarly attention (Li, 2001; Xu & Meyer, 2013)—with emphasis
being placed on examining the role of institutional factors in channeling
organizational attention, decision-making, and actions. This growing interest
is clearly reﬂected in two recent special issues on strategic management in
emerging markets. In Hoskisson et al.’s (2000) Academy of Management
Journal special issue, the editors highlighted institutional theory as one of
the key theories used in the special issue papers. Then, ﬁve years later, in a
special issue of the Journal of Management Studies, Wright et al. (2005)
noted that institutional theory “has indeed risen, as predicted by Hoskisson
et al. (2000), to become a new dominant theory guiding strategy research on
emerging economies”.
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As scholarship on emerging markets has developed over recent decades,
researchers have pointed to a number of important differences among emer-
ging economies. Most notable is the difference between countries in Asia,
Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East that were formerly classiﬁed as
developing economies and transition economies in the former Soviet Union,
Eastern Europe, and East Asia (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Khanna & Palepu,
2010; Wright et al., 2005). This latter group of countries is uniquely character-
ized by a shift from centrally planned economies to market economies—
reﬂected in increased privatization, the changing role of government, and
legal and institutional reforms.
Although emerging economies differ in their pace of political and economic
change and growth, they share a number of characteristics that not only differ-
entiate them from the more traditionally studied developed markets, but also
create a set of general challenges for navigating their business environments.
Thus, for the purposes of our review, we focus more on the similarities across
emerging markets in terms of economic, market, and institutional conditions.
We also highlight key sources of variation between emergingmarkets and devel-
oped and developing market contexts. In many ways, emerging markets occupy
an intermediate position between developed and developing markets—speciﬁ-
cally in terms of the extent of market liberalization, the degree of integration
into the global economy, and the level of economic development (Hoskisson,
Wright, Fitatotchev, & Peng, 2013). Identifying the similarities and differences
between these contexts is an important ﬁrst step to better understanding how
organizations can strategically manage or alter aspects of their institutional
environment to obtain or retain competitive advantage.
Economic and Market Conditions
A deﬁning feature of emerging market economies is that they are “low-income,
rapid-growth countries using economic liberalization as their primary engine
of growth” (Hoskisson et al., 2000, p. 249; see also Arnold & Quelch, 1998).
The importance of such markets to global corporations and investors is
demonstrated by the proliferation of emerging market typologies, such as
BRICS, CIVITS, and EAGLES,1 and the development of lists of emerging econ-
omies by key market actors including the IMF, FTSE, MSCI, S&P, Dow Jones,
and Russell. Table 1 provides a list of countries considered emerging econom-
ies across current categorizations—importantly, it shows general convergence
on which countries are included.
Figure 2 plots the major countries of the world along the dimensions of
economic growth rate and per capita GDP—key dimensions by which emer-
ging economies are identiﬁed. As the ﬁgure shows, countries that are typically
considered emerging economies are clustered in the middle of the graph, occu-
pying a prime spot with respect to future growth prospects: relatively high GDP
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Table 1 Emerging Markets Identified by Major Investment Classification Sources
Country IMFa FTSEb MSCIc S&Pd Dow Jonese Russellf
Argentina † †
Brazil † † † † † †
Bulgaria †
Chile † † † † † †
China † † † † † †
Colombia † † † † † †
Czech Republic † † † † †
Egypt † † † †
Estonia †
Greece † †
Hungary † † † † † †
India † † † † † †
Indonesia † † † † † †
Latvia †
Lithuania †
Malaysia † † † † † †
Mexico † † † † † †
Morocco † † † †
Pakistan † †
Peru † † † † † †
Philippines † † † † † †
Poland † † † † † †
Romania †
Russia † † † † † †
South Africa † † † † † †
South Korea † † †
Taiwan † † † † †
Thailand † † † † † †
Turkey † † † † † †
Ukraine †
UAE † †
Venezuela †
aSee IMF world economic outlook update, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/update/
02/index.htm.
bSee FTSE country classiﬁcation, September 2010, http://www.ftse.com/Indices/Country_
Classiﬁcation/Downloads/Sept%202010/FTSE_Country_Classiﬁcation_Sept_2010_Update.pdf.
cSee MSCI Emerging markets list, http://www.mscibarra.com/products/indices/international_
equity_indices.
dThe S&P global broad market index, 31 December 2010, p. 2. https://www.sp-indexdata.com/
idpﬁles/citigroup/prc/active/factsheets/Factsheet_SP_Global_BMI.pdf.
eSee Dow Jones indexes country classiﬁcation system, http://www.djindexes.com/mdsidx/
downloads/brochure_info/Dow_Jones_Indexes_Country_Classiﬁcation_System.pdf.
fSee Russell global indexes—Construction and methodology, http://www.russell.com/documents/
indexes/construction-methodology-global-indexes.pdf.
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growth rates and moderate GDP per capita. These economies are often charac-
terized by active consumer markets, increased competition, and decreasing
trade barriers. Developed economies, in contrast, are clustered on the
bottom right side of the graph, reﬂecting a relatively low average GDP
growth rate and high GDP per capita. These economies have typically
reached a relatively mature state of industrial development and are character-
ized by a service-oriented market, low trade barriers, and minimal government
intervention in business.
As for developing economies, the average GDP growth rate varies consider-
ably and the average GDP per capita is low—leading to a clustering of these
countries on the left side of the graph. These developing countries tend to
have high levels of poverty and unemployment, accompanied by moderate
to high trade barriers. They typically suffer from stiﬂing bureaucracy and gov-
ernment policies that provide little incentives for entrepreneurship, trade, or
investment. Thus, unlike emerging economies, economic growth in these
locations is heavily constrained by barriers that hinder ﬁrms’ ability to partici-
pate in the global economy.
There are also critical differences in the business mix between emerging,
developed, and developing markets. For example, emerging economies typi-
cally have a higher proportion of manufacturing, labor-intensive, and large-
scale heavy industry sectors (Murrell & Wang, 1993; Sit & Liu, 2000). Such
characteristics are in many ways the hallmark of their growth trajectories, as
lower labor costs tend to drive growth in manufacturing and exports. This
pattern, however, has been shown to shift over time as industrialization and
modernization progress. Rising household incomes, for example, have
fueled discretionary purchases among burgeoning middle-class consumer
sectors—thus increasing the demand for both services and a variety of
consumer products. Such shifts are readily apparent in Indonesia and
Figure 2 Average GDP Growth and Average GDP Per Capita of Major Countries of the World.
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the Philippines, which have now transitioned into strong domestic
economies.
Capital markets also tend to be less developed in emerging economies than
in developed ones, making ﬁnancial exchanges more volatile, trading less liquid
and inﬂation particularly problematic. Moreover, because key ﬁnancial inter-
mediaries such as accounting ﬁrms, ﬁnancial analysts, and venture capitalists
are either absent or only marginal present (Li & Atuahene-Gima, 2002; Peng
& Heath, 1996), ﬁrms are free to exploit information asymmetries within the
markets. Not only does this increase the potential for opportunism because
of the prohibitively high costs monitoring, but it also makes legal contracts dif-
ﬁcult to enforce (Hiatt & Sine, 2014b; Marquis & Qian, 2014). Overall, the con-
ditions imply that while emerging markets provide promising opportunities for
growth, their market environments may be relatively tumultuous and uncer-
tain compared to those of their more developed counterparts.
Institutional Conditions
In addition to baseline economic differences, numerous political, legal, socio-
cultural, and technological factors differentiate the business environments of
emerging economies from those of developed and developing economies.
One critical factor is the strong inﬂuence of the government and the prevalence
of state-owned ﬁrms (Douma, George, & Kabir, 2006; Evans, 1995; Musacchio,
& Lazzarini, 2014; Ralston, Terpstra-Tong, Terpstra, Wang, & Egri, 2006).
Highlighting the strong government presence in emerging markets, Kowalski,
Bu¨ge, Sztajerowska, and Egelandet (2013) note that the shares of state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) among the Forbes Global 2000 companies currently exceed
50% for China, India, and Indonesia; and are at 39% and 19% for Russia and
Brazil, respectively.
Emerging markets are characterized by greater informality and less devel-
oped government and regulatory infrastructures, suggesting that market regu-
lation, corporate governance, transparency, accounting standards, and
intellectual property protection may not be as reliable or mature as those in
more advanced economies (Marquis & Qian, 2014; Marquis, Zhang, &
Zhou, 2011). To further complicate matters, emerging market governments
have been shown to be particularly susceptible to external conﬂicts, coups,
and internal tensions, which increases the risk of unstable resource exchanges
and information ﬂows (Hiatt & Sine, 2014a). Figure 3 documents the different
types of political regimes that exist across emerging economies, and note that
with a few notable exceptions, such as China, most emerging market econom-
ies are democracies.
Beyond differences in political and legal institutions, there are critical
differences in the socio-cultural environment of emerging, developed, and
developing economies. Unlike most developed economies, emerging
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economies tend to be characterized by a young population, an expanding
workforce, and rapid urbanization. In addition, many socio-cultural issues
in emerging economies are ideologically fueled—suggesting that some of
the parties involved may have an interest in sustaining rather than resolving
conﬂicts (Lamertz, Martens, & Pursey, 2003; Mahon, Heugens, & Lamertz,
2004). The potential for social turmoil and upheaval suggests that being
aware of, and attentive to, issues such as income inequality and poverty,
gender inequality, and ethnic and linguistic factionalization is an important
part of navigating these contexts (Ault & Spicer, 2014). While similar
issues are also prevalent in developing economies, the challenges are com-
pounded by poor educational systems, high illiteracy, and a lack of adequate
health care.
As this discussion clearly shows, there are important differences in the
economic and institutional conditions of emerging, developed, and developing
market economies. In many ways, as noted earlier and illustrated in Figure 1,
emerging economies can be thought of as occupying a sweet spot between these
two extremes. Crucially, they have the needed infrastructure and systems to
allow for productive business activity, yet are still at an early enough stage of
development to allow for high growth rates.
Figure 3 Emerging Markets by Political Regime Type.
Note: Countries classified based on the “polity score”, a scale that ranges from 110 (strongly
democratic) to 210 (strongly autocratic). http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polity_data_series.
Autocracy 5 210 to 26; closed anocracy 5 25 to 0; open anocracy 5 1 to 5; democracy
5 6 to 9; full democracy 5 10. An anocracy is defined as “a regime-type where power is not
vested in public institutions but spread amongst elite groups who are constantly competing with
each other for power” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anocracy).
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While we recognize that there are substantial differences between emerging
markets, our review focuses on identifying the key institutional challenges that
are generalizable across these contexts. In doing so, we aim to classify the types
of strategies that have been advanced for addressing these challenges—focusing
on “indigenously” developed strategies as well as strategies from developed
market contexts that have been adapted and reconﬁgured to address the idio-
syncratic conditions of emerging economies. We foreground the importance of
institutional strategies in emerging markets because the rapid co-evolution of
the economy and society (Luo, 2006) suggests that organizations need to adopt
a strategic perspective that encompasses both market imperatives and social
and cultural concerns. As Hoskisson et al. (2000, p. 252) point out, “govern-
ment and societal inﬂuences are stronger in these emerging economies than
in developed economies”.
Table 2 describes in more detail the key dimensions by which emerging con-
texts vary from developed and developing economy contexts. These critical
variations, and the attendant challenges and opportunities they create, have
important implications for the competitive landscape that organizations
must navigate.
Institutional Strategies in Emerging Markets
Since the 1990s, organizations have increasingly been exposed to a diverse set
of political, social, and cultural environments. This exposure has led organiz-
ations to not only become more sensitized to local environments and their
idiosyncratic institutional demands, but also more strategic in how they “capi-
talize on the strengths of particular locations” (Khanna, Palepu, & Sinha, 2005,
p. 15). Yet theory, until recently, has mainly focused on how such environ-
ments become increasingly similar owing to the homogenizing pressures of
globalization (Meyer, Boli, Thomas, & Ramirez, 1997). Our perspective is
that local and regional differences will persist, creating variegated challenges
for organizations as they expand into new markets and engage in cross-
border partnerships (Marquis & Battilana, 2009).
After reviewing literature spanning various disciplines including strategy,
international business, political science, entrepreneurship, and organization
studies, we found that institutional strategies can be broadly categorized
along three dimensions: relational, infrastructure-building, and socio-cultural
bridging. While our identiﬁcation of these different strategies emerged from
our review of the literature, we note that they also generally correspond to
prior typologies of institutional variation (e.g. Busenitz, Go´mez, & Spencer,
2000; Scott, 2014). Yet, a key difference between our conceptualization and
this prior work is that our typology is focused on mapping the array of strategic
actions organizations adopt to address institutional constraints—as opposed to
describing or categorizing the institutional environment. In the following
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Table 2 Key Economic and Institutional Differences Between Types of Markets
Developed markets Emerging markets Developing markets
Economic conditions
† Developed capital
markets with moderate to
high levels of liquidity
† “Meaningful” regulatory
bodies
† High levels of per capita
income
† Dominance of industrial
and service sector
† Minimal trade barriers
† Low GDP growth rates
† Marginally developed
capital markets with low
levels of market liquidity
† Low levels of per capita
income and high income
inequality
† Rapid economic growth
and development
† Volatility in ﬁnancial
capital inﬂows
† High levels of inﬂation
† Modernization of
infrastructure
† Dominance of
manufacturing and
labor-intensive industries
† Decreasing trade
barriers
† High GDP growth rates
† Poorly developed capital
markets with low levels of
market liquidity
† Low levels of per capita
income and high levels of
poverty
† Stagnant productivity
† Stiﬂing bureaucracy hinders
entrepreneurship, trade, and
investment
† High dependence on
agriculture
† Moderate to high trade
barriers
† Unfavorable balance of
trade
† Low GDP growth rate
Institutional conditions (political, legal, socio-cultural, and technological)
† Formal regulatory
infrastructure in place
(e.g. market regulation,
corporate governance,
transparency and
accounting standards)
† Moderate to high
standard of living
High
† Moderate to high
Human Development
Index (HDI) levels
(education, literacy, and
health)
† Advanced technological
and commercial
infrastructure
† High degree of political
freedom
† Little government
intervention in business
† Non-transparent
political and regulatory
environment
† Improving standard of
living
† Young population and
expanding working
population
† Moderate to high
Human Development
Index (HDI) levels
† Increasing urbanization
† Burgeoning middle class
† Growing demand for
consumer goods
† Prevalence of state-
owned ﬁrms
† Low to moderate degree
of political freedom
† Moderate to high levels
of government
intervention in business
† Absence of specialized
intermediaries and regulatory
systems
† Low standard of living
† Low Human Development
Index (HDI) levels
† Poor education system and
high illiteracy
† High unemployment
† Lack of adequate health care
† Low degree of political
freedom
† Moderate to high risk of
social unrest and war
† Constraining government
policies hinder economic
develop and global
integration
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section, we develop the conceptualization of the three types of strategies
further, detailing how they have been discussed in the literature and the relative
appropriateness of particular strategies in emerging economy contexts.
Relational Strategies
A critical dimension of an organization’s institutional strategizing relates to
how it interacts with and manages important referent audiences. Through
effective management of relationships with both internal and external actors,
an organization can not only enhance its competitive position in the market
(Berman, Wicks, Kotha, & Jones, 1999; Heugens, van den Bosch, & van Riel,
2002; Hillman, Zardkoohi, & Bierman, 1999), but also ensure the stability
and certainty of its resource exchanges (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Pfeffer
& Salancik, 1978). Three interrelated streams of research have provided
strong empirical support for these claims: stakeholder management, resource
dependence, and corporate political strategy. Common among these streams
is the belief that “organizations require more than material resources and tech-
nical information if they are to survive and thrive in their social environment”
(Scott, Ruef, Mendel, & Caronna, 2000, p. 237)—that is, they also require social
approval and legitimacy.
Research on stakeholder management suggests that an organization should
take a broad view of its dependence relationships—to include “any group or
individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of an organization’s
objectives” (Freeman, 1984, p. 46). Ample anecdotal and empirical evidence
suggests that effective management of primary stakeholder groups has a posi-
tive impact on ﬁnancial performance (Berman et al., 1999; Laplume, Sonpar, &
Litz, 2008; Waddock & Graves, 1997), organizational learning (Harting, Har-
meling, Venkataraman, & Arnold, 2006; Heugens et al., 2002), and the devel-
opment of intangible assets (Hillman & Keim, 2001). Conversely, failure to
attend to key stakeholder concerns has been shown to irreparably damage
an organization’s legitimacy, and threaten its proﬁtability and growth potential
(Berman et al., 1999; Clarkson, 1995; Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Freeman,
Wicks, & Parmar, 2004). Harrison, Bosse, and Phillips (2010) argue, for
example, that satisfying the needs and demands of an organization’s legitimate
stakeholders does more than simply retain their willful participation in the
ﬁrm’s productive activities, it also helps spur information sharing and inno-
vation. Similarly, Henisz, Dorobantu, and Nartey’s (2014) study of the global
mining industry showed that companies carefully manage external relations
as a means to “reduce opportunistic hold-up by stakeholders” with whom
the ﬁrm has no direct ties, but whose cooperation is needed for the ﬁrm to
create and capture value.
Resource dependence theory echoes these arguments by stipulating that the
focus of much organizational action is on assessing and managing relationships
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with external actors that control critical or scarce resources (Oliver, 1991;
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Research from this tradition conceptualizes an
organization’s external environment as comprising other organizations with
diverse agendas and interests—whose support and approval are vital to the
organization’s ongoing operation (Wry, Cobb, & Aldrich, 2013, p. 442). To
address the various demands placed upon an organization, resource depen-
dence scholars have advanced a number of strategies to absorb, diffuse, and
co-opt external constraints. Studies have shown, for example, that organiz-
ations can diversify sources of supply (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), shift board
composition or create interlocks (Boyd, 1990; Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold,
2000; Marquis, 2003), and engage in inter-organizational partnerships and
agreements (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Pfeffer, 1972) to shift the balance of
power in their favor.
While the previous two streams of research take a broader view of depen-
dency relationships, research on corporate political strategy tackles a more
speciﬁc dependence relationship—that between business and government.
Recently, there has been growing scholarly interest in the area of corporate pol-
itical activity (CPA), deﬁned as a set of activities aimed at shaping or producing
public policy outcomes that are favorable to a ﬁrm’s continued economic sur-
vival and success (De Figueiredo & Tiller, 2001; Keim & Baysinger, 1988;
Schuler, 1996). Indeed, a proliferation of studies have documented the antece-
dents of CPA (for a review, see Hillman et al., 2004; Lux, Crook, & Woehr,
2011), the types of political strategies and tactics organizations deploy (e.g.
Jia, 2014; Oliver & Holzinger, 2008; Walker & Rea, 2014; Zhao, 2012), and
the resultant outcomes of CPA on public policy (Choi, Jia, & Lu, 2015;
Holburn & Vanden Bergh, 2008; Ramı´rez & Eigen-Zucchi, 2001) and ﬁrm per-
formance (Cook & Fox, 2000; Hiatt & Park, 2013; Shaffer, Quasney, & Grimm,
2000).
Insights from this body of research suggest that ﬁrms direct their CPA to
react to, anticipate, defend against, or proactively shape public policy arenas
and political demands (Oliver & Holzinger, 2008; see also Bonardi, Holburn,
& Vanden Bergh, 2006; Hillman et al., 2004). As the magnitude and scope
of government policies expand into the business sphere, effective and strategic
management of government relations is becoming a key determinant of a
ﬁrm’s current and future competitive position (Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Keim
& Hillman, 2008; Yofﬁe, 1988). Increasing evidence suggests that by strategi-
cally managing business–government relations, ﬁrms can enhance political
legitimacy, receive preferential policy status, and gain access to critical state
resources (Hillman et al., 2004; Marquis & Qian, 2014; Zhao, 2012). Weiden-
baum (1980, p. 46) noted decades earlier that public policy was no longer a
“spectator sport for business”, Barley (2007, p. 201) now warns that organiz-
ations “wield inordinate political power”, enabling them to “undermine repre-
sentative democracy and the public good: promoting legislation that beneﬁts
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corporations at the expense of individual citizens”. Thus, it is becoming
increasingly clear that relational strategies have important implications not
only for the organization that employs them, but also for society at large.
Relational strategies in emerging economies. Much of the literature to date
in these areas has explicitly focused on developed market economy contexts—
with little attention paid to the relative applicability of these strategies in emer-
ging market contexts. Relational strategies that are effective in developed
economy contexts may be ill-suited for, or misaligned with, the idiosyncratic
conditions of an emerging market context. Peng et al. (2008, p. 930), for
example, argue that while research in developed economies indicates that
some ﬁrms actively seek to shape the “rules of the game” in their favor, such
political strategies may be less effective in emerging economies, given their
“generally nontransparent political and regulatory environment”. That is,
rather than proactively seeking to inﬂuence public policy, organizations may
focus their political strategies on furthering their own self-interests—for
example, getting government subsidies, licenses, and tax exemptions
(Hillman et al., 2004; Okhmatovskiy, 2010). In short, where the government
has a high degree of control over key factors of production, access to the
market, or valuable natural resources, effective management of resource depen-
dences may be especially critical to an organization’s performance and long-
term viability (Peng & Heath, 1996; Peng & Luo, 2000).
A nascent, but growing, body of research has highlighted the importance of
interpersonal networks, social capital, and informal institutions in contexts of
“institutional uncertainty”, wherein social norms, trust, and personal ties are
critical in facilitating cooperation and the regulation of social behavior
(Chung, 2006; Kostova & Roth, 2002; Luo & Chung, 2005; Peng, Sun,
Pinkham, & Chen, 2009; Peng et al., 2008; Puffer & McCarthy, 2007; Zhu &
Chung, 2014). Peng and Luo (2000) found that managers relied heavily on
interpersonal networks as informal substitutes for weak market structures—
using alliances and inter-organizational agreements to both grow the ﬁrm
and assure that the terms of a transaction would be met by the parties involved.
Similarly, Nee (1992, p. 10) documented that in socialist states many private
ﬁrms depended upon informal sources of credit and close ties with local gov-
ernments in order to compensate for “restrictions on factor resources and the
continuing pariah-like status of capitalists and merchants”. Such political savvy
has been found to be particularly consequential in emerging economies, where
rule of law is absent, regulations can change quickly, and the risk of expropria-
tion and government intervention is relatively high.
These studies suggest that the integration of corporate political strategies
with market strategies is of critical importance in emerging economies
because boundaries between the government and business spheres are often
blurred (Keim & Hillman, 2008; Li, Peng, & Macaulay, 2013; Sun,
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Mellahi, & Wright, 2012; Wang, 2014). As Melewar, Badal, and Small’s (2006)
study of Danone’s entry into China showed, political sensitivity toward power
relations and the need to win (and keep) the goodwill of inﬂuential people in
business and politics was crucial in gaining market acceptance. Puffer,
McCarthy, and Boisot (2010), similarly, found that entrepreneurs relied
heavily upon “blat” and “guanxi”—that is, informal connections and relation-
ships based on reciprocity and exchange of favors within Russia and China,
respectively—to help reduce uncertainty, protect private property and owner-
ship rights, and facilitate business transactions.
While up to this point, we have emphasized the beneﬁts and advantages of
close ties with the government and other political actors, there is a growing
body of research suggesting that such ties are also associated with a number
of vulnerabilities and constraints. Recent studies have shown that direct ties
to the government may expose an organization to strong pressures to divert
its resources to advance political goals and agendas (Marquis & Qian, 2014;
Okhmatovskiy, 2010). Nee and Opper (2010) point out that state-owned
ﬁrms with connections to political elite often perform worse than private
ﬁrms because they are pressured to maintain higher employment levels (see
also Fan, Wong, & Zhang, 2007; Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). Similarly, Child
and Lu (1996) showed that the economic reform of large SOEs in China was
hindered by constraints associated with close ties to the government. Such
ﬁndings echo those of Kozhikode and Li (2012), who revealed that commercial
banks in India that were either owned or dependent on the government were
not able to take advantage of political opportunities to the same extent as their
private counterparts. Thus, while politically connected ﬁrms may enjoy a
number of advantages over their peers, these advantages may come at a
cost—particularly, if the value of such connections depreciate or become nega-
tive after unexpected political shocks (Sun, Mellahi, & Thun, 2010, p. 1162).
On a broader stakeholder level, studies of advanced market economies have
highlighted various strategies that ﬁrms use to gain stakeholder support,
manage stakeholders, and balance stakeholder interests (for a review, see
Laplume et al., 2008). Yet, questions remain of “both the desirability and feasi-
bility of introducing or even imposing American-type approaches in emerging
economies” (Hoskisson et al., 2000, p. 263). For instance, while the strategy of
balancing the claims of primary stakeholder groups has been argued to opti-
mize ﬁrm welfare in developed market economies (Donaldson & Preston,
1995; Harrison & St. John, 1996; Walsh, 2005), such a strategy may not be
effective or feasible in emerging economies. This is likely the case in labor-
intensive industries, where proﬁt margins are so narrow that simultaneously
attending to the demands of multiple audiences may threaten an organization’s
ﬁnancial performance and survival as a going concern (Campbell, 2007). Such
situations may lead organizations to prioritize the concerns and interests of
shareholders above those of customers and the wider public. Julian and
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Ofori-dankwa (2013), for example, note that while studies undertaken in devel-
oped economies posit a positive relationship between ﬁrm ﬁnancial resource
availability and corporate social responsibility (CSR) expenditures, the
reverse may be true in emerging economies because the government is
focused more on economic development and job creation than promoting
CSR. Thus, in emerging economies, the prioritization of stakeholder groups
may not be an issue of stakeholders’ power or legitimacy (c.f. Mitchell et al.,
1997), but rather the “sticks and carrots” inherent in the competitive market
environment.
A managing-for-stakeholders approach may require further adjustments in
authoritarian regimes such as China and Turkey, which not only exercise strict
media and Internet censorship, but also suppress the development of NGOs
and consumer watchdog organizations. These conditions leave few outlets
for stakeholders to express their frustrations and concerns—save for boycotts
and other forms of private politics (Rodriguez, Siegel, Hillman, & Eden, 2006).
Consequently, there is often a need to develop alternative negotiation and com-
munication channels other than those used (and taken for granted) in demo-
cratic countries. For instance, in the absence of a well-developed NGO sector,
Internet activism has become an important mechanism for civil society
expression (Luo, Zhang & Marquis, 2014).
For multinationals operating in emerging economies, another important
consideration relates to home country stakeholder concerns. Soule, Swami-
nathan, and Tihanyi (2014) found that pressure from home country stake-
holders played a greater role in multinationals’ divestment decisions in
Burma than did ﬁnancial considerations or unrealized business opportunities.
In particular, the nation’s human rights abuses and brutal repression of the
pro-democracy movement had damaging effects on both the image and the
credibility of multinationals operating in Burma. For multinationals, then, stra-
tegic management of stakeholders may require a broader scope, encompassing
groups and concerns from both home and host countries.
In sum, an organization’s relational strategies are inextricably tied to politi-
cal conditions as well as the relative quality and reliability of market and regu-
latory infrastructures. Where government involvement in business is pervasive
and contract-enforcing mechanisms are weak, relational strategies become
especially critical to an organization’s ability to secure resources, support,
and social legitimacy from important external audiences (Hillman et al.,
1999; Hoskisson et al., 2013; Khanna et al., 2005).
Infrastructure-Building Strategies
Core to economic and sociological approaches to markets is the importance of
commercial, technological, and physical infrastructures to facilitate market
interactions and transactions. When such infrastructures are absent or
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limited, there are a number of challenges that need to be overcome. Research
has posited various mechanisms to address this lack of institutional infrastruc-
ture, including informal mechanisms such as collective organization and net-
works, and formal processes such as developing or following international
standards.
There are many examples of institutional entrepreneurs engaging in collec-
tive mobilization processes to create new organizational forms or arrangements
as a means to overcome limited institutional infrastructures (Mair & Marti,
2009; Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 2008). Rao (1998), for example, traced how
the absence of well-deﬁned consumer protections in the early twentieth-
century USA led social entrepreneurs to establish consumer watchdog organ-
izations to advocate for consumer interests. Clemens (1997), similarly, docu-
mented how successive waves of mobilization by unions, farmers, and
women’s groups altered the face of American politics by institutionalizing lob-
bying and legislative monitoring. More recently, Thelen (2004) detailed how
skill formation in the early industrial period interacted with the development
of collective bargaining institutions, labor unions, and employer organizations
to spawn different vocational training systems in Britain, Germany, Japan, and
the USA.
Other studies from the non-market strategy literature have pointed to the
development of self-regulation schemes promoted by industry groups such
as the chemical industry’s Responsible Care Program (Gunningham, 1995;
King & Lenox, 2000); as well as to the myriad of cases where businesses
have informally organized or created networks to develop or reﬁne the
formal regulatory environment (Davis & Thompson, 1994; Walker & Rea,
2014). In all of these cases, groups of actors worked to establish a set of
rules, guidelines, or policies to better deﬁne and guide future business
interactions.
In addition to highlighting the development of new organizational arrange-
ments and the promotion of informal or formal regulatory structures, research
in this tradition has identiﬁed the importance of standardization strategies
that are “concerned with the establishment of technical, legal or informal
standards that deﬁne what is ‘normal’ for a practice, product, or service”
(Lawrence, 1999, p. 177). One well-known set of global standards was devel-
oped by the International Standards Organization (ISO), whose goal is to
facilitate global commerce through deﬁning consistent standards for business
to follow across a wide array of product categories and business processes
(Guler, Guille´n, & Macpherson, 2002). Another important international
project is the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), which promotes a standard
set of environmental, social, and governance metrics for corporations—as a
means to encourage companies to report on these items, and to raise aware-
ness of these issues on a global level (Etzion, & Ferraro, 2010; Marquis & Qian,
2014).
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Infrastructure-building strategies in emerging economies. A signiﬁcant
research thrust of the work on emerging economies focuses on how many
elements of the institutional infrastructure needed to facilitate commercial
activities are not present, marginally developed or highly ambiguous
(Khanna & Palepu, 2010; Mair et al., 2012; Uzo & Mair, 2014). Where key
market information is not readily available or reliable, and formal rules are
not established or well deﬁned, organizations face additional uncertainty and
challenges (Ault & Spicer, 2014). For instance, research has discussed how a
lack of advertising and marketing research makes it difﬁcult to accurately
assess consumer interests and consumption patterns. In addition, the lack of
well-established intellectual property protection regulations poses a signiﬁcant
threat to the competitive advantage of ﬁrms, as piracy and patent infringe-
ments can “siphon away revenue and damage brand image” (Bird, 2006,
p. 431). Summarizing these challenges, Arnold & Quelch (1998, p. 9) note
that in emerging economies “there is little or no reliable market data, nonexis-
tent or poorly developed distribution systems, relatively few communication
channels, and both a lack of regulatory discipline and a propensity to change
business regulations frequently and unpredictably”.
Another important consideration in emerging economies is underdeveloped
physical and commercial infrastructures, such as inadequate communication
technology, transportation infrastructure, power generation capabilities, and
distribution channels (Hitt, Dacin, Levitas, Arregle, & Borza, 2000; Miller,
1998). Luthra, Mangaleswaran, and Padhi (2005), for example, note that com-
panies doing business in the Indian market need to overcome the challenges of
poor roads and underdeveloped seaports, which can make it difﬁcult to trans-
port goods and to work with suppliers. Hoskisson et al. (2013, p. 1300) similarly
note how India’s poor transportation infrastructure has hindered the develop-
ment of its automobile industry, because “trafﬁc problems in Indian cities
create congestion” and “narrow and underdeveloped streets are a constraint”.
To address these issues, ﬁrms frequently develop and rely more heavily on a
number of informal and collective mechanisms (Hoskisson et al., 2000; La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1998; Peng & Heath, 1996). Khanna
et al. (2005) described how in countries such as China where food safety pro-
blems are endemic, supermarket chain Metro has fostered networks between
farmers and distributors in rural areas in order to improve the quality and
reliability of its meats and vegetables. Indeed, a long-standing set of research
on institutional voids has shown the importance of developing business
groups to minimize opportunistic behavior and transaction costs (Khanna &
Palepu, 2000a, 2000b; Khanna & Rivkin, 2001; Nachum, 2004). Bruton and
Ahlstrom (2003) found that venture capitalists in settings with weak regulatory
institutions were more likely to fund geographically proximate ﬁrms because
monitoring was easier and more important in such settings. In all of these
cases, ﬁrms are engaging in collective action to overcome problems associated
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with a lack of adequate or reliable information, or underdeveloped physical and
commercial infrastructures.
A number of studies have also highlighted the importance of developing
intermediary institutions and processes as a way to address uncertainty.
These could include institutions such as credit agencies and standard setting
bodies (Khanna & Palepu, 2010), as well as programs to develop intermediary
skills, human capital, and relevant expertise. Marquis, Yin, and Yang (2013),
for instance, analyzed how the Chinese government and large companies par-
ticipated in the creation of a new set of China speciﬁc CSR reporting standards
and training programs to help Chinese companies implement this new global
practice. More generally, London and Hart (2004) found that successful MNCs
often incorporate local capacity building such as training programs and advi-
sory services directly into their business models. Other studies have identiﬁed
the importance of business processes to better manage increased uncertainty.
Hiatt and Sine’s (2014a) study of entrepreneurship in Columbia showed that
the uncertainty caused by violence and unrest could be offset by formal
business planning. In general, the lack of intermediaries and intermediary
business processes in emerging economies creates a signiﬁcant constraint on
ﬁrm activities—often requiring creative action to overcome.
Another type of infrastructure-building strategy that is increasingly
common in emerging economies is the use of existing global standards that
foster a common language and understanding of business practices and out-
comes (Guler et al., 2002). The importance of global standards has attracted
international attention as global consumers increasingly focus on labor and
environmental conditions in supply chains. Bartley (2003, 2007) has a series
of studies that examine the evolution of the Forest Stewardship Council, an
example of “market-oriented, nongovernmental standards and monitoring
systems as a supplement to state regulation” (O’Rourke, 2003, p. 5). Likewise,
Tarnovskaya (2012) showed how Ikea worked directly with World Wildlife
Fund, a global nonproﬁt, to develop responsible forestry management and cer-
tiﬁcation of its wood suppliers in Russia and China—two contexts where such
standards did not exist. The result was a set of practices and tools for not only
educating and training suppliers, but also raising awareness throughout the rest
of society. However, while global standards such as the GRI have dramatically
increased the uptake of environmental reporting, there remain questions about
whether these standards and practices make it easier for organizations in emer-
ging markets to only “symbolically” comply with global norms (Marquis &
Qian, 2014; see also Okhmatovskiy & David, 2012; Tilcsik, 2010).
While one set of strategies helps ﬁrms deal with the uncertainty of emerging
markets, the other set helps them build greater legitimacy in the eyes of key sta-
keholder groups such as consumers, governments, and civil society. When
ﬁrms compete in non-home country markets, they frequently face an “illegiti-
macy discount” (Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002), which shapes how they approach
Institutional Strategies in Emerging Markets † 311
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [C
hr
ist
op
he
r M
arq
uis
] a
t 1
4:5
9 2
7 M
arc
h 2
01
5 
the given market (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). A common strategy to raise legiti-
macy is to promote economic and social development (Marquis et al., 2011;
Zhang & Luo, 2013), which not only helps with the speciﬁc brand and
image of a particular ﬁrm, but also of multinationals in general. It is important
to recognize that consumer preferences in emerging markets may be different
from those of consumers in home country markets such that corporations
must ﬁrst establish the legitimacy of an entire product category before they
can effectively market their speciﬁc products. Tarnovskaya (2012), for instance,
showed that to succeed in markets such as China, where the concept of
modular and consumer-assembled furniture was uncommon, Ikea had to
conduct a number of media and marketing campaigns to educate consumers
about this type of product.
Thus, where key commercial, technological, and physical infrastructures are
missing or underdeveloped, savvy global businesses may step in and build these
infrastructures in ways that create competitive advantage. Alternatively, they
may bring with them the “missing” infrastructure—transposing it from
home to host countries (Miller, 1998). For businesses, then, it is critical to con-
sider infrastructural gaps and necessities. Yet, at the same time, it is important
to keep in mind that emerging economies are undergoing continual and rapid
change—such that it may be “misguided short-termism to base corporate strat-
egy on structural conditions that may be subject to rapid change” (Arnold &
Quelch, 1998, p. 12).
Socio-cultural Bridging Strategies
Research has shown that market transactions “do not happen in a vacuum, but
in speciﬁc social, cultural, and political contexts” (Okhmatovskiy, 2010,
p. 1039). By adopting socio-cultural bridging strategies, organizations both
attend to and shape the socio-cultural and demographic characteristics of
their competitive environment—for they are not merely subject to socio-cul-
tural and demographic issues, but also active participants. As Khanna et al.
(2005, p. 16) point out, many multinationals are either powerful enough to
alter the contexts in which they operate, or their products and services are
valued enough to force dramatic changes in local markets. Studies in inter-
national business and strategy have underscored the importance of appreciat-
ing local conditions when embarking on international diversiﬁcation and
cross-border partnerships (Hitt, Hoskisson, & Kim, 1997; Hitt, Tihanyi,
Miller, & Connelly, 2006). In particular, factors such as population demo-
graphics and local norms have been shown to affect an organization’s ability
to obtain physical and human resources, to market their products or services,
and to expand their operations. Higher education levels, for example, have
been shown to inﬂuence hiring and retention practices because they affect
employee expectations as well as job mobility (Campion, Cheraskin, &
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Stevens, 1994; Fallick, Fleischman, & Rebitzer, 2006). In addition, the aging
workforce in most developed economies has placed businesses at risk of not
only losing critical knowledge and skills when employees retire, but also dimin-
ished productivity in physically demanding jobs (Khanna et al., 2005).
While the importance of appreciating the socio-cultural and demographic
landscape is well recognized, much of the literature in strategy has “paid less
attention to normative and cognitive institutions in favor of studying the regu-
latory environment” (Hitt et al., 2006, p. 847). The emphasis, in other words, is
typically placed on examining factors such as country portfolio analysis, politi-
cal risk assessment, corruption ratings, and governance indicators as opposed
to the “soft infrastructures” that support market activity (Khanna et al., 2005).
Yet such soft infrastructures have been found to both constrain and enable
organizational behavior by inﬂuencing what constitutes “appropriate” behav-
ior as well as the criteria for legitimacy (Greenwood et al., 2011; Scott,
2014). Greenwood, Diaz, Li, and Lorente’s (2010) study on Spanish manufac-
turing ﬁrms revealed how local institutional pressures constrained the willing-
ness of manufacturing ﬁrms to downsize their workforce as a response to
market exigencies. Similarly, Molotch, Freudenburg, and Paulsen (2000)
found that historical processes generated a distinctive “lash-up” of character
and tradition that fundamentally shaped the business landscapes of Santa
Barbara and Ventura—inﬂuencing the types of organizations that ﬂourished,
the consumption of goods, and the dynamics of local organizations
(Marquis, Davis, & Glynn, 2013).
Kostova and colleagues’ work on multinational enterprises (MNEs) suggests
that the difﬁculty of understanding and correctly interpreting local insti-
tutional requirements is a function of the “institutional distance” between
the home and host countries (Kostova & Roth, 2002; Kostova & Zaheer,
1999; see also Busenitz et al., 2000). Put differently, ﬁrms typically ﬁnd it
easier to do business in countries where the social climate is similar to their
own because the greater the distance, the more adaptation is required to
better align practices, strategies, and operations with host country contexts
(Kostova & Roth, 2002). Arnold & Quelch (1998, p. 12), similarly, note that
managers frequently based decisions to expand operations “not on objective
market screening but on their own comfort level, choosing a predictable
sequence of markets beginning with those closest in ‘psychic distance’ to
their home culture”. Research on cultural entrepreneurship echoes these argu-
ments, suggesting that organizations can bridge institutional divides by lever-
aging social and cultural resources to legitimate new organizational structures
and practices (Hargadon & Douglas, 2001; Johnson, 2007). Lounsbury &
Glynn (2001, p. 545) convincingly argue that cultural entrepreneurs are able
to craft a new venture identity that serves as a “touchstone upon which legiti-
macy may be conferred by investors, competitors, and consumers”, opening up
access to new capital and market opportunities.
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While existing research has provided important insights into the insti-
tutional variation across developed nations (e.g. Hall & Soskice, 2001;
Whitley, 1999), few studies have systematically examined institutional vari-
ation between developed and emerging market economy contexts. This
paucity has led to a limited understanding of the applicability of cultural brid-
ging strategies across these contexts.
Socio-cultural bridging strategies in emerging economies. In emerging
economies, organizations are faced with a set of complex demographic and
socio-cultural issues. As noted earlier, demographic challenges such as a
young workforce, lack of available skilled workers, and increasing urbaniz-
ation are especially problematic in these contexts (Hiatt & Sine, 2014b;
Mahon et al., 2004). To combat these challenges, organizations have been
found to invest heavily in employee training and development, to bring
over experts and managers from the organizations’ home countries, and to
make location decisions based on the availability of skilled labor (Arnold &
Quelch, 1998; Kostova & Roth, 2002; Puffer et al., 2010). Ready, Hill, and
Conger (2008) argue that as more companies peg their prospects for
growth on emerging markets, the “war for talent” intensiﬁes—leaving compa-
nies with the challenging task of recruiting and retaining a local workforce
that now has more options and higher expectations. Indeed, there is
growing empirical evidence that establishing a core group of local talent is
critical to understanding regional conditions and cultural norms. Reinforcing
this point, Boxenbaum and Battilana (2005) note that transporting manage-
rial practices from one social context to another requires adaptation and, at
times, the combination with local practices.
In terms of socio-cultural issues, emerging economies often face a number
of challenges including demographic disparities, ideologically fueled social
unrest, and local hostility toward growing migrant worker populations
(James, 2011; Lamertz et al., 2003). Underscoring the importance of under-
standing local socio-cultural conditions, London & Hart (2004, p. 364) advo-
cate the need for social embeddedness, which refers to “the ability to create
competitive advantage based on a deep understanding of and integration
with the local environment” (see also Chung & Luo, 2013). Similarly, Luo &
Peng (1999, p. 272) note that local knowledge and experience can provide
MNEs with a signiﬁcant competitive advantage—reﬂecting an “ownership-
speciﬁc, intangible asset which can generate economic rents”. In short,
Melewar et al. (2006, p. 408) suggest that companies seeking to expand their
operations abroad need to “alter their modes of operation to suit prevailing cul-
tural and market conditions”.
Another important consideration in terms of cultural bridging—particu-
larly in transition economies—is the enduring legacies of past Soviet-style
market economies and Communist regimes (Child & Marko´czy, 1993;
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Kriauciunas & Kale, 2006; Li et al., 2013; Murrell & Wang, 1993; Pop-Eleches,
2007; Spicer, McDermott, & Kogut, 2000). Traces of these legacies can still be
seen in the excess physical and human resources characterizing many state-
owned, or recently privatized, ﬁrms. Peng and Heath (1996) attribute this
pattern to the residual Socialist ideology of full employment, which has gener-
ated strong normative pressures on managers to ﬁnd uses for excess human
resources rather than downsizing. Relatedly, there are still strong societal
expectations from the labor force and the wider public that organizations
provide health care, education, and accommodation for employees and their
families (Han, Zheng, & Xu, 2014; Kriauciunas & Kale, 2006; Zu & Song,
2009). Addressing these residual expectations is often challenging for an organ-
ization because they typically run counter to the logic of capitalism, which
stresses the primacy of markets and competition (Tilcsik, 2010). Shaking off
these Socialist legacies often requires more than changes in market and regu-
latory infrastructures. It requires fundamental shifts in normative understand-
ings and value systems regarding business–employee relationships, private
ownership, and proﬁt.
A greater appreciation of these legacies is critical for understanding how
local norms, values, and expectations continue to enable and constrain organ-
izational behavior and strategic action in emerging economies (Han et al.,
2014; Kriauciunas & Kale, 2006). Raynard, Lounsbury, and Greenwood
(2013), for example, found that the legacies of China’s past political regimes
continued to shape how organizations conceptualized, experienced, and
implemented government-led CSR initiatives—such that some organizations
focused on employee welfare and social initiatives, while others focused on
corporate governance or environmental concerns. In another study, Stark
(1996, p. 995) documented how the persistence of routines, practices, and net-
works of afﬁliation could become “assets, resources, and the basis for credible
commitments and coordinated actions in the postsocialist period”.
In sum, navigating between diverse institutional environments can present
a number of challenges and opportunities for organizations (Kostova, 1999;
Kostova & Roth, 2002; Xu & Shenkar, 2002). For scholars, appreciating the
consequential role of local socio-cultural conditions is important because, as
Peng et al. (2008, p. 922) point out, the “treatment of institutions as back-
ground is insufﬁcient to gain a deep understanding of strategic behavior and
ﬁrm performance . . . its deﬁciency becomes even more striking when
probing into emerging economies”. Oftentimes, the formal and informal
rules of the game differ between emerging and developed economy contexts.
As such, knowledge of local institutional conditions may be a critical factor
in inﬂuencing a ﬁrm’s competitive position.
Taking stock of the rich literature on the similarities and differences across
institutional contexts provides a more holistic understanding of the unique
pattern of social and cultural factors that shape business–society interactions.
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For organizations, a better understanding of socio-cultural differences is criti-
cal in helping to bridge cultural divides that may hinder international expan-
sion and growth. As organizational theorists have long contended, responding
appropriately to socio-cultural expectations is critical for gaining access to
resources, legitimacy, and social approval (Oliver, 1991; Pfeffer & Salancik,
1978).
Table 3 summarizes and provides examples of the three institutional strat-
egies our review uncovered.
Discussion and Conclusions
This review focused on identifying the critical factors that enable and constrain
institutional strategizing in emerging economy contexts in order to provide an
integrated perspective on institutional strategies that can be applied to diverse
contexts. Synthesizing a wide range of literature from strategy, international
business, political science, entrepreneurship and organization studies, our
review highlighted the agentic and intent-driven nature of organizational
responses to institutional pressures; and, the critical importance of such
responses in emerging economy contexts. Our intended contribution was to
provide a framework for mapping the wide array of strategies organizations
deploy to leverage and shape socio-political and cultural institutions to their
competitive advantage. In so doing, we directly address Mahon et al.’s (2004,
p. 170) critique that current research “has little to offer in the way of a truly
integrated perspective on the management of non-market forces”.
Bringing Emerging Markets Research to the Center of Organizational Studies
Despite growing scholarly interest in examining emerging markets, there are
few conceptual models that provide a comprehensive picture of the unique
challenges and opportunities facing organizations in these contexts. In
drawing attention to this lacuna, we are, in a sense, recommending a sea
change in organizational theories—namely, a shift from an emphasis on tra-
ditional developed markets and contexts to integrating emerging economies
in how organizational behavior is conceptualized. As Figure 1 clearly
shows, emerging market economies are quickly rising to the center of
global markets. This important trend reinforces Hoskisson et al.’s (2013,
p. 1297) observation of emerging markets: “Empirically they are interesting
because of their increasing economic signiﬁcance. Theoretically they are
interesting as they involve hybrid cases between developed and emerging
economies.” Future research on emerging markets promises to not only
shed new light on existing management theories and practices, but also
extend our understanding of how organizations navigate diverse institutional
landscapes.
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Table 3 Types of Institutional Strategies in Emerging Markets
Institutional strategy deﬁnitions Importance in emerging markets
Relational strategies: The actions and
activities taken to interact with and
strategically manage important referent
audiences, including political bodies and
key stakeholder groups
† Cultivate interpersonal networks and
social capital as “substitutes” for weak
market structures and underdeveloped
regulatory and legal infrastructures
† Engage in political strategies focused on
furthering organizational self-interests
instead of directly inﬂuencing public
policy—for example, government
subsidies and tax exemptions, access to
key factors of production and valuable
natural resources, etc.
† Leverage informal connections and
relationships to reduce uncertainty,
protect private property, and regulate
social behavior
Infrastructure-building strategies: The
actions and activities taken to address
marginally developed markets, and
underdeveloped social, technological,
and physical infrastructures
† Engage in collective organizing to
pursue and promote infrastructure
development
† Develop informal mechanisms and
standardization strategies for addressing
“institutional voids”
† Develop or promote global standards to
foster a common language and
understanding of business practices and
outcomes
Socio-cultural bridging strategies: The
actions and activities taken to address the
socio-cultural and demographic issues/
challenges, which shape the competitive
environment
† Develop knowledge and experience of
local conditions and features—for
example, partnering with local ﬁrms,
hiring local senior managers and
consultants, investing in ﬁeld
investigations, learning from local
competitors, and building local talent and
capacity
† Recognize that the legacies of past
political regimes may continue to shape
the business environment, particularly in
transition economies—for example,
excess physical and human resources,
strong societal expectations for
organizations act as “mini welfare states”,
etc.
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We reviewed work that can be considered part of a ﬁrm’s institutional stra-
tegizing, and identiﬁed three distinct sets of strategies that can be used to
manage relationships with important stakeholders, to address missing or
underdeveloped infrastructures, and to tackle demographic and socio-cultural
challenges. Unlike prior research that has mainly focused on regulatory or pol-
itical contexts, our review suggests the need for a broader conceptualization of
the institutional environment—requiring a synthesis of ideas and insights from
various research domains, as well as greater attention to the institutional
underpinnings of ﬁrms’ strategies (Peng et al., 2009).
From our review, it is clear that while there has been a proliferation of
research on relational strategies in emerging markets, less attention has been
paid to examining infrastructure-building and socio-cultural bridging strat-
egies in these contexts. Yet these latter sets of strategies are particularly impor-
tant for navigating emerging markets because there are typically strong
institutional pressures on organizations to promote and support economic
development and market liberalization— that is, through the development of
physical and commercial infrastructures, improving quality and safety stan-
dards, and attending to demographic disparities. Moreover, engaging in
these types of activities may be in the best interest of an organization
because they help facilitate day-to-day operations, mitigate uncertainty, and
stabilize resource exchanges. Thus, by helping countries fully develop their
potential, multinationals can create a win–win situation for the country and
the company (Khanna et al., 2005). Unfortunately, however, there is quite a
bit of evidence suggesting that some organizations are more interested in
exploiting demographic and cultural factors to further their own interests at
the expense of the wider public. Studies have found, for example, that compa-
nies have often exploited the cheap labor, lax environmental and consumer
protection policies, and ambiguous intellectual property rights in emerging
markets (Campbell, 2007; Marquis et al., 2011; Raynard et al., 2013). Beyond
such opportunistic behavior, there is also evidence that organizations have
strong-armed governments in emerging economies to develop regulations
and policies that enhance their competitive position (Puffer et al., 2010;
Zhao, 2012). This type of “regulatory capture” creates an uneven playing
ﬁeld, beneﬁting some organizations to the detriment of others.
To better understand the complex interplay between organizations and
local contexts, future research could examine how the strategy formulation
and implementation processes of ﬁrms operating in emerging markets differ
from those of ﬁrms in developed markets. Because of their prominent role
in stimulating economic and social development, for instance, ﬁrms in these
contexts may be more inclined to involve broader stakeholder groups in
their strategy formulation processes. It would be interesting to see whether
and how an “inclusive” stance on stakeholder management affects the socio-
cultural and demographic landscape of emerging markets. Alternatively,
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studies could examine how and why the repertoire of institutional strategies is
modiﬁed as a ﬁrm shifts from developed to emerging market contexts—or vice
versa. For instance, under what conditions are speciﬁc institutional strategies
more effective in emerging markets than developed ones? Are politically
directed relational strategies more important in authoritarian regimes than
democratic ones? How does the transition to a more market-oriented
economy affect the types of strategies selected? Unpacking the contextual
factors that inﬂuence the applicability of particular institutional strategies
will provide important insights into the interrelationship between organiz-
ations and local institutions.
Another area that may be potentially ripe for future research is how entre-
preneurs navigate inadequate or missing market and regulatory infrastructures
to gain access to critical start-up capital and resources (Hiatt & Sine, 2014a).
Whereas studies in developed economies have shown that property protection
and intellectual property rights regulations are “essential to entrepreneurship”
(Puffer et al., 2010, p. 443), studies in emerging markets suggest that entrepre-
neurs rely on alternative strategies such as developing informal connections to
local government ofﬁcials and accessing informal sources of credit to overcome
underdeveloped market infrastructures (Khanna & Palepu, 1997; Nee, 1992;
Peng & Luo, 2000). More research is needed to better understand the full reper-
toire of strategies that help facilitate entrepreneurial activity in emerging
market contexts.
A crucial next step is to better deﬁne how the institutional capacity of an
emerging economy to support corporate activity differs from that of developed
economies. While we created a baseline set of differences in Table 2, there is
signiﬁcant room for more speciﬁc questions. For example, how do the socio-
political and demographic conditions of emerging and developed economies
enable or constrain the repertoire of institutional strategies available to
ﬁrms? Are some strategies more urgent in emerging economies than in devel-
oped ones? Furthermore, assuming that not all emerging economies follow
Western-style patterns of economic development, how do differences in their
developmental trajectories affect the types of institutional strategies selected?
Beyond examining how institutional strategies differ between emerging and
developed countries, future research could examine how and why particular
institutional strategies are more (or less) effective across different emerging
economies. As we noted in the outset, while emerging economies share a
number of similarities as compared to their more developed counterparts,
they are not a homogenous group. It is thus important to avoid the potential
pitfall of making broad generalizations across these contexts. As Hoskisson
et al. (2013, p. 1316) recently noted,
. . . it is time to move beyond a simple dichotomy that divides the world
into emerging and developed economies. There is a need to consider
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more ﬁne-grained notions of institutional context with varying degrees
of institutional development and infrastructure and factor market
development.
We second this call and suggest that one fruitful line of research could examine
the strategic implications of operating in former developing economies versus
transition economies—as it is “not clear whether experience from centrally
planned economies in transition applies to those emerging economies that
have not followed this trajectory” (Wright et al., 2005, p. 27). As Figure 3
shows, there are a variety of different political systems, each of which could
create another layer of variation across these contexts.
Along these lines, future studies could examine the added challenges of
implementing relational strategies in transition economies, wherein the pre-
viously closed nature of these economies has led most MNCs to have few
links to business networks (Arnold & Quelch, 1998, p. 9). Related to this,
is the question of how legacies of past Socialist and Communist regimes con-
tinue to affect the competitive landscape facing organizations in transition
economies—as opposed to those emerging economies that were formerly
developing economies (Kriauciunas & Kale, 2006; Raynard et al., 2013).
For instance, how is the competitive landscape changing as state-owned
companies shed their traditional roles as “mini welfare states”, responsible
for employee healthcare and education? Similarly, what are the implications
for organizations’ relational strategies as governments retract or extend
their inﬂuence in the business sphere? While such considerations are
especially important in contexts where the state serves as a gatekeeper to
critical resources, they may be less so in settings with weak states
(Khanna et al., 2005). In these latter contexts, the repertoire of relational
strategies is likely to be very different from that of ﬁrms operating in con-
texts where the state’s inﬂuence pervades nearly every aspect of business
and society.
The answers to such questions will be important to understanding global
competition moving forward—for globalization has opened up a “two-way
street”, wherein businesses from advanced economies are not only expanding
and diversifying into emerging markets, but businesses in emerging economies
are also increasingly entering developed markets (Li, 2010; Luo & Tung, 2007;
Zhang, Duysters, & Filippov, 2012). Illustrating this point, Guille´n & Garcı´a-
Canal (2009, p. 27) argue that because multinationals from emerging econom-
ies are “more used to dealing with discretionary and/or unstable governments
in their home country, they are better prepared than the traditional MNEs to
succeed in foreign countries characterized by a weak institutional environ-
ment”. Huawei, for example, was able to leverage a number of creative rela-
tional strategies developed in China to become a major supplier to European
telecommunications operators (Zhang, 2014).
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We encourage future research to delve deeper into the differences between
emerging and developed economies as well as differences across emerging econ-
omies. Doing so requires more cross-country comparative studies relying on
both quantitative and qualitative methods. While most studies to date have
employed quantitative approaches to examine emerging market contexts (Hos-
kisson et al., 2000;Wright et al., 2005), research using qualitative methods could
prove useful in capturing the richness and diversity of these institutional land-
scapes. In-depth interviews, ethnographies, and participant observation, for
example, would provide an up-close, “on-the-ground” look at how ﬁrms
develop and adapt their institutional strategies as they move from one market
context to another. We would also encourage more longitudinal research to
capture the changes in strategies that are unfolding as emerging markets
evolve and mature. Future studies, for instance, could explore whether and
how improvements in commercial infrastructures alter the effectiveness of par-
ticular relational or socio-cultural bridging strategies. In a similar vein, studies
could examine the appropriate temporal sequencing of strategies as the insti-
tutional landscape changes to incorporate elements of a free-market economy.
Overall, the aforementioned discussion sets out new research directions
aimed at promoting cross-disciplinary dialogue, and exploring how organiz-
ations strategically navigate and manage the increasing complexities of their
institutional environments. Integrating different theoretical lenses to explore
emerging economies will enable us to extend existing organizational theories
and challenge conventional wisdom in academic thinking that has been domi-
nated by examinations of developed market contexts (Wright et al., 2005).
Institutional Theory: A New Frontier
Our conceptualization of institutional strategies has important implications for
deﬁning a new frontier of research on institutional theories. As globalization
proceeds and emerging markets continue their remarkable growth trajectory,
institutional theory is increasingly being drawn upon to provide crucial
insights into the effects of institutional variation on organizational behavior
and performance (Greenwood et al., 2011; Wright et al., 2005). For, as Hoskis-
son et al. (2013, p. 1317) point out, “Incorporating an institution-based view
provides a more contextualized perspective, suggesting that the resources
that ﬁrms need to achieve competitive advantage depend upon the type of
host economy in which they are competing compared to their home
country”. Indeed, strategy scholars have underscored the importance of both
understanding and adapting to institutional variations when embarking on
joint ventures and entering new markets (Ahuja & Yayavaram, 2011; Peng
et al., 2009)—yet, the implication of our review is that organizations may
need to undertake a greater variety of strategies to align their practices and
operations with different host country contexts (Kostova & Roth, 2002).
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Such a shift in emphasis requires movement away from top-down, passive
conceptualizations of institutions to a more bottom-up interactive perspective
that recognizes that organizations must be strategic in shaping their external
contexts. Several streams of research have moved in this direction—including
institutional entrepreneurship (Battilana et al., 2009), cultural entrepreneur-
ship (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001), institutional logics (Greenwood et al.,
2011), and institutional work (Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2009, 2011).
Research from the institutional logics perspective, for instance, adopts a
dynamic constructionist stance, wherein actors exposed to heterogeneous insti-
tutional arrangements have the “reﬂective capacity to innovate and create insti-
tutional change” (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 110). These streams of research have
provided important insights into how organizations maintain their existing
position in current institutional structures, while managing and building
upon the institutions around them (Battilana & D’Aunno, 2009; Hargadon
& Douglas, 2001).
In this review, we adopted a different approach by highlighting a more
interactive view of institutional processes that complements traditional per-
spectives. Because the prior literatures that we have reviewed have not typically
been considered under the institutional theory ambit, they have not been
shaped by implicit assumptions that actors are constrained in their insti-
tutional actions. In reviewing and synthesizing these literatures, our intention
was to identify the agentic and intent-driven nature of organizational strategies
by which corporations help shape and construct institutional contexts.
Our focus on emerging economy contexts drew attention to two key areas
for future research. First, it highlighted the need to be open to challenging long-
standing assumptions, testing existing theories, and developing new theories to
account for the diversity of the contemporary global market. In many ways, our
theoretical toolkits have been dominated by observations of, and insights
derived from, developed market contexts—leading them to be somewhat mis-
aligned with the current reality facing corporations. As organizations increas-
ingly expand their operations into institutionally diverse contexts, the relative
appropriateness and feasibility of transposing institutional strategies as “ready-
made” solutions become more dubious (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Peng et al.,
2009; Wright et al., 2005). In particular, the target, prioritization, and timing
of institutional strategies are likely to vary between contexts. For instance, in
contexts where there is frequent state intervention in business, the prime
target of relational strategies may be political actors as opposed to NGOs. Simi-
larly, when the state controls local ﬁnancing, licensing, and/or access to raw
materials and energy, relational strategies with the state may be prioritized
not only over those with other stakeholder groups, but also over infrastruc-
ture-building and socio-cultural bridging strategies. In terms of timing, it is
likely that organizations will direct their attention to these strategies ﬁrst,
before implementing other strategies because political legitimacy and
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support are pre-requisites to conducting business in these contexts. As we
noted earlier, more research is needed to fully tease apart the factors that inﬂu-
ence how an organization’s repertoire of institutional strategies varies across
different market economies.
Second, our review revealed the need for more dynamic conceptual models
of the institutional pressures exerted on organizations. For the most part,
current institutional theorizing has been grounded in rather static “snapshots”
of a particular organizational or industry context over a relatively short period
of time (Davis, 2010). Such snapshots may be inappropriate, or worse, mislead-
ing, when applied to emerging economies—which are characterized by fast-
paced turbulent change. We, thus, encourage future studies to explore how
organizations develop dynamic strategy repertoires, which enable them to
learn, reconﬁgure, and adapt strategies in response to rapidly changing con-
ditions (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Wright et al., 2005). In doing so, we
echo Tilcsik (2010), who argues that future research should examine organiz-
ational “responses and the actors who implement them in motion, exploring
how responses are formulated, contested, and altered over time” (p. 1493,
emphasis original). Such research would likely require a “boots on the
ground” approach to not only capture the unfolding processes in situ, but
also gain a more ﬁne-grained understanding of the complex decision-
making processes that underpin them.
In advocating this new frontier of institutional scholarship, we aim to high-
light the importance of collaboration and discussion across disciplines, and the
need to appreciate the myriad of institutional landscapes that organizations
currently face. Thus, while our review focused on institutional strategizing in
emerging economy contexts, we believe that the insights generated herein
have broader applicability for theorizing about developed economies—and
for building institutional theory more generally. For example, as the global
economy becomes more integrated and the conditions in emerging economies
move closer to those of developed economies, organizations’ repertoires of
institutional strategies are likely to evolve and possibly converge—blurring
the lines between strategies tailored for emerging and developed economy con-
texts. Similarly, it is likely that as government intervention in business expands
in some contexts and contracts in others, the relative effectiveness of relational
strategies may extend across previously differentiated markets. These, however,
are empirical questions that require further research to conﬁrm. We encourage
further cross-fertilization of research from emerging and developed market
contexts—as a means to build more general and practical theory.
Conclusion
By bringing together diverse streams of research under the umbrella of “insti-
tutional strategies”, we draw attention to a number of important research
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opportunities. The core contribution of this paper is that it maps the ﬁeld of
research on institutional strategies, and highlights potential avenues for
future research. As our review showed, there is a biased selection and focus
in current research—namely, a disproportionate emphasis on developed
markets. This raises some concern regarding the applicability of current
models and theoretical toolkits in the context of emerging markets. To
address this concern, we offer up a comprehensive framework of institutional
strategies that not only provides a more realistic account of the diverse insti-
tutional conditions that organizations confront, but also highlights the impor-
tance of expanding the current focus from developed markets to a more global
perspective. Our hope is that by outlining future research directions and raising
provocative research questions, our review will encourage scholars to challenge
and test existing theories, and to engage in more fruitful cross-disciplinary
dialogue.
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